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  Clientelism, welfarism, patronage and abuse of welfare are topics which 
have fed a heated debate in both political science and public management fields. 
  According to Lemarchand and Legg (1972), political clientelism “may be 
viewed as a more or less personalized, affective, and reciprocal relationship 
between actors, or sets of actors, commanding unequal resources and involving 
mutually beneficial transactions that have political ramifications beyond the 
immediate sphere of dyadic relationships”. 
 
  Abstract 
This paper tries to analyse the effects of political clientelism on the 
performance of public utilities and organizations in Italy. Shortly, clientelism consists 
in a series of reciprocal convenience-based relationships between politicians and 
individuals, commanding unequal resources and involving mutually beneficial 
transactions in terms of economic, social and political consequences. 
The motivation of this research stems from the fact that analysing the effect of 
clientelism may contribute in (1) improving the quality of electoral strategies and the 
resulting public policies and (2) managing the performance of public organizations 
according to a sustainable perspective. 
Hence, the key issues of the paper are the following: is clientelism a 
sustainable mechanism to enlarge the consensus of a given party? How does 
clientelistic practice impact on public organizations management and subsequent 
performances? What should public managers do to limit the effect of clientelism and 
maintain satisfying performance results in providing services towards citizens? 
In the light of the above questions, the paper points out the cause-and-effect 
relations among those variables underlying such clientelistic practices by using a 
System Dynamics approach which allows one to frame a complex system and 
understand its development over time. More in details, Roniger (2004) explains that “clientelism involves 
asymmetric but mutually beneficial relationships of power and exchange - a non-
universalistic quid pro quo between individuals or groups of unequal standing. It 
implies mediated and selective access to resources and markets from which others 
are normally excluded. This access is conditioned on subordination, compliance or 
dependence on the goodwill of others. Those in control – the so called patrons, sub-
patrons and brokers – provide selective access to goods and opportunities and place 
themselves or their supporters in positions from which they can divert resources 
and services in their favour. Their partners – the so called clients – are expected to 
return their benefactors’ help, politically and otherwise, by working for the patron 
at election times or boosting the patron’s prestige and reputation”.  
  In practice, clientelistic agreements entail votes and support given in 
exchange for jobs and other benefits handed over by incumbent and contesting 
power-holders as favours. Then, it surely becomes a successful strategy for 
building political consensus and, thus, contributing in winning the elections. 
Whereas, on the other hand, clientelism alters those rightful dynamics among 
democratic actors which should normally regulate and determine a democratic 
system. In fact, aiming to reach voters consensus, it does not ensure justice and 
equality in access to both jobs and services provided by public organizations. 
  Many politicians are considerable as professionals of clientelism since they 
cunningly tend to hide clientelistic practices behind the need of sustaining 
unemployed people; this allows them to hire a large number of unemployed 
workers in public organizations. Thus, this job placement method does not take 
into account meritocracy, HR skills and capabilities, transparency of the public 
action and social accountability.  
  From this perspective, by creating situations of over-employment and 
under-qualified personnel in the P.A., politicians mortify both meritocracy and 
public accountability: all the mechanisms of administrative control and 
performance evaluation de facto are voluntarily made ineffective to hide the loss of 
productivity caused by clientelism effects.  
  Unfortunately, the persistence of clientelistic dynamics also negatively 
influences the entire culture of a community in terms of (1) resistance to change 
bad working attitude of civil servants and (2) mistrust of citizens towards public 
institutions. As far as this is concerned, the lack of both work-oriented culture and 
public social responsibility dangerously damages the natural aptitude of a 
community to improve its socio-economic context and, in doing so, compromises 
the future of next generations: in fact, by growing up beside bad working 
stereotypes and mistrusting the public authority, young populations homogenize 
themselves to such behaviours and, searching for a wealthy future, young talents 
emigrate from their mother countries which so will be devoid of those fundamental 
resources. 
  Resuming, clientelism represents an easy and fast political technique 
which, on the one hand, favours the election of politicians but, on the other, causes 
negative impacts onto the socio-economic structure in the long term. 
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  Italy is a sixty-five years old democracy. As it happens in almost all young 
democracies (Keefer, 2005), clientelism has appeared since the beginning of the 
Italian democracy. To be correct, several studies have demonstrated that it is 
always existed, assuming different connotations in accordance with social and 
political characteristics of each ages (Neumann, 1956; Roninger, 1983; Veyne, 
1990; Piattoni 2005).  
 Italian clientelism has had different expressions and consequences 
depending on specific regional contexts. On this concern, an exhaustive analysis on 
Italian clientelism and its features may be referred to Piattoni (2005) studies; 
instead, this paper focuses on the dynamics of the so called ‘vicious’ clientelism 
since, during the last decade, several examples has been detected in many regional 
and local contexts which are still experiencing negative effects of clientelism 
lastingness.  
  In short, Italian clientelism aims to increase and maintain the consensus of 
a given party/representative by assigning jobs and offices in Public Administrations 
(P.P.A.A.) and, consequently, creating gratitude-based relations with the electorate. 
In the long term, such practice has implied a drastic increase of human resources 
(HR) inside public organizations which have nowadays to face increasing financial 
losses linked to the raise of salaries and an overall paralysis of the public services 
supply. 
 The need to restore public financial losses naturally imposes rapid 
solutions: usually, public monetary resources shifting together with the increase of 
tax rate represent the best stratagem that Italian politicians have applied. 
Nevertheless, if such mechanism is systematically used, a big volume of the public 
money flow will be subtracted to other important social investments (healthcare, 
education, infrastructure, housing, etc.) damaging the overall wealth of the country.  
  So, the trade-off between high tax rate and bad public services allocation – 
within a context characterized by declining wealth – succeeds in breaking those 
fidelity-based relations between governors and voters and, in doing so, causes the 
decrease of the party’s consensus. Particularly, the lack of wealth – that citizens 
perceive in the long term – produces a ‘boomerang’ effect in terms of political 
consensus preservation. 
  Figure 1 displays the trends of the main variables which are involved in a 
clientelistic democracy and, precisely, approximates such behaviours to the current 
Italian perspective. 
  In the analysis of a system far from a mindset according to which public 
managers should work to achieve the legislatively mandated goals and objectives 
of their organizations as efficiently and effectively as they can (Moore, 1995), 
Italian public managers are often hostages of political actors – who have been 
charged from – and, due to this, their activity basically consist in undertaking 
operational choices by favouring particularistic political interests rather than acting 
for the common good of people. Therefore, public managers activity is not assessed 
on the basis of operative results and social impacts (i.e. output, outcomes) but, 















Figure 1 The behaviours of the main variables over time 
 
  In the long term, the economic self-sufficiency distinguishes a clientelistic 
from a streamlined public organization: the former yearly increases its financial 
losses, while the latter, indeed, is able to cover operational costs by supplying 
useful services and, thus, restoring its capital investments (Sorci, 1995). In the 
Italian clientelistic system, public organizations are voluntarily left without 
financial and operational autonomy from political power and this is also revealed 
by the widespread lack of effective planning and control systems which likely 
makes useless data from annual financial statements and, in doing so, hampers the 
opportunity to assign responsibility to public managers and civil servants. 
  Such way of managing – characterized by an intentional absence of 
management control – creates a dangerous detachment between public 
organizations and their users within the Italian social system; particularly, this 
mainly stems from the unfeasibility in providing transparently information about 
the results achieved by the public machine to its stakeholders, that is also, 
removing their participation in public affairs.  
 Recently, in order to reduce such inefficiencies and innovate P.A. 
activities, a reform has been introduced by the Italian government (Law n. 15 
issued on 4 March 2009, so called ‘Brunetta reform’ from the inspiring minister 
name).  
  In short, such reform aims to: 
  promote transparency, performance assessment, HR merit-based 
incentives and integrity in P.P.A.A.; 
  stress on P.A. results by encouraging citizens participation; 
  learn from best practices observed in other countries; 
  innovate technologically P.A. services and operative processes. 
  Therefore, by referring to New Public Management principles, it moves 
towards the encouragement of public employees on the basis of the performance 
they reach during their working activity. Doubtlessly, the reform testifies the 
institutional will to improve P.A. efficiency and effectiveness, and represents a 
relevant starting point to promote and spread a positive work-oriented culture 
among public offices.  
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P.A. performance since its implementation requires more length of time. But, what 
is appearing from recent insights reveals that two circumstances complicate the 
goals achievement of such reform: 
1.  a cultural background of P.P.A.A. - characterized by bureaucracy and 
slowness of processes - that is averse to change towards effectiveness and efficacy-
based standards. 
2.  the complexity in evaluating the performance of P.P.A.A. offices and 
workers – particularly, managers – due to the lack of effective performance 
evaluation tools and index within the strategic control system adopted by public 
organizations. 
  In conclusion, from the analysis of the current Italian system, it clearly 
emerges that the extreme use of clientelistic practices is involving dangerous 
consequences on its socio-economic context. Particularly, the lasting effects of 
clientelism have caused unsustainable conditions for an adequate development of a 
country in which politicians interests de facto diverge from the common good of 
the community. 
  In the next section, a System Dynamics model will be introduced in order 
to explain Italian clientelism development by linking and analysing feedback 




 In order to analyze dynamically cause-and-effect relationships of 
clientelism, the author have used the System Dynamics methodology. System 
Dynamics is an approach for modelling and simulating complex physical and 
social systems and experimenting with the models to design policies for 
management and change (Forrester, 1958).  
  Model structures are realized by linking those relevant variables which 
determine a certain behaviour of the observed system over time. In these 
connections, feedback loops are the building blocks for articulating the dynamics 
of these models and their interactions can explain the system behaviour (Choucri et 
al., 2007). Such methodology identifies the complex interactions among feedback 
loops, rejects notions of linear cause-and-effect, and requires the analyst to view a 
complete system of relationships whereby the ‘cause’ might also be affected by the 
‘effect’. This means that a variable, ceteris paribus, influences another variable (1) 
positively (i.e. an increase of the one corresponds to an increase of the other and 
vice versa), (2) negatively (i.e. an increase of the one corresponds to a decrease of 
the other and vice versa), (3) according to a non-linear relation between them. 
Further, if such relations shape closed circuits, these are defined as feedback loops 
and are responsible for the system behaviour. Shortly, reinforcing loops (R) 
produce exponential trends of the system over time; instead, balancing loops (B) 
limit such effect by tending to a steady state. 
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system behaviour, and the system behaviour determines the organization 
performance, then the key to developing sustainable strategies to optimize 
performance is understanding the relationship between processes and behaviours 
and managing the leverage points. An in-depth overview of System Dynamics can 
be found in Forrester (1961) and Sterman (2000). 
 
3. The model structure 
 
  The model of Italian clientelism consists in a causal loop diagram, that is, a 
structure in which variables – that play significant roles in the system – affect other 
variables according to those logical relationships that regulate their interactions. 
While relations are portrait as ‘arrows’, the type of relation among variables is 
identified by a plus (+) if positive and a minus (-) if negative. The behaviour of the 
system stems from the effect of the feedback loops in it. 
  The structure – that is going to be introduced – tries to capture those 
critical feedbacks loops of clientelistic systems with a specific focus on local rather 
than national level. Before starting the analysis of the model’s feedback loops, it 
seems opportune to point out those factors that positively influence clientelism.  
  According to a subjective prospective, it appears reasonable to distinguish 
between: 
¾  Political factors, or rather factors which encourage politicians to search 
for clientelistic agreements with voters. Specifically, they are:  
a)  political competition: stressful competitions often lead candidates to 
reinforce their consensus in unfair ways and, obviously, clientelistic 
practices represent the easiest mechanism to achieve such goal.  
b)  absence of electoral strategies: the critical combination among the lack 
of professional and political skills, a short political experience and the 
virtual distance from people needs, causes the unfeasibility to 
formulate suitable political strategies in facing electoral campaigns, 
but, on the other hand, instigates politicians to stipulate informally 
clientelistic agreements with voters. 
c)  political privileges: the extraordinary number of privileges – that 
Italian politicians hold once elected – makes their election extremely 
desired and, also, may represent a useful weapon to foster clienteles. 
Surely, such privileges strongly weigh upon public budgets. 
¾  Social factors, which instead push citizens to promote alliances with 
politicians in order to meet their requests. They are:  
a)  unemployment rate: high rates of unemployment lead people to claim 
for public intervention which is normally realized by hiring a large 
number of workers in P.P.A.A. and public utilities.  
b)  economic crises: closely connected to unemployment rate, economic 
crises are sources of social worries which are often seen by politicians 
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clientelistic agreements with voters. 
c)  barriers to improve P.A. working aptitude: due to the political 
protection that clientelism gives to public employees, the working 
culture of Italian civil servants suffers from a traditional inclination to 
avoid offices accountability and work inefficiently. This class of 
workers appears reluctant to change its working aptitude and, thus, 
supports clientelism lastingness. 
  Figure 2 shows the model structure which consist of three reinforcing and 


























Quality of public 
services
Under-qualified





































Figure 2 Model structure of Italian clientelism system 
 
  Namely, the major feedback loop (R1) considers the strategic alliance 
between politicians and voters which represents the objective of every clientelistic 
agreement. 
  Then, on the one hand, clientelism responds to voters requests by assigning 
offices and jobs in P.P.A.A. and, on the other, voters – together with their families 
or clans of supporters – pay back politicians by voting for them during elections 
and, so, enlarging their political consensus. In fact, more people are hired in 
P.P.A.A. through clientelistic mechanisms, more people will become faithful 
supporters of the party which has benefitted them. 
  Reasonably, the good functioning of the mechanism allows parties to gain 
more representatives in both political offices and decision making processes; as a 
consequence, politicians will foster those existing clientelistic agreements and 
enlarge such practice to other groups or lobbies of citizens. 
Review of International Comparative Management              Volume 11, Issue 2, May  2010  331    Volume 11, Issue 2, May  2010                   Review of International Comparative Management  332 
  The reinforcing loop (R2) represents the so called ‘word of mouth’ 
phenomenon which – transposed from marketing sciences – explains the passing of 
information from person to person. Therefore, the consensus increase leads to 
gather more voters which, in turn, will advertise the party within the community 
and, in doing so, enlarge its consensus. 
  On the other hand, the over-employment caused by the effect of clientelism 
directly affects the number of total wages that P.P.A.A. pay to their employees. 
  Accounting techniques suggest that salaries represent negative components 
of financial statements and, due to this, they may contribute in expanding losses of 
financial resources which, then, have to be restored with other public resources (i.e. 
public income). Therefore, using public funds to restore financial losses of 
P.P.A.A., ceteris paribus, reduces social investments (e.g. healthcare, education, 
infrastructures, housing, etc.) which are logically essential to improve the wealth of 
a region. 
  The perception of regional wealth can be specifically measured by the 
level of community satisfaction that directly feeds back into political consensus of 
current governors. In other words, loop B1 demonstrates that the dispersion of 
public resources associated to P.A. over-employment obstacles and retards the 
normal development of a region since public funds must be transferred from social 
investments to covering those useless HR costs associated to clientelism 
consequences. So, the decrease of community satisfaction causes the reduction of 
political consensus and, in doing so, counteracts the effect of clientelism as seen in 
loop R1. Often, governors try to face up to the need for more public income by 
raising tax rates
1: on the one hand, this policy – highlighted by loop B2 – indeed 
leads to increase public income but, on the other, strongly encourages taxpayers to 
evade taxes, especially in presence of an unbalanced trade-off between the supply 
of public services and the burden of taxation, and so, decreases public income 
flowing in (loop R3). 
 Furthermore, loop B4 underlines the indirect linkage between fiscal 
pressure and community satisfaction: in fact, raising tax rates intuitively meets with 
community disappointment and, once again, such impact is stronger whenever the 
tax increase does not involve improvements in public service activities towards 
citizens. Likewise, both meritocracy refusing and clientelism-based employment 
imply a widespread diffusion of under-qualified personnel into P.P.A.A.. As loop 
B3 testifies, the lack of professional skills and work motivation indirectly 
influences the quality of public services with consequent negative effects on the 
social wealth of the region. 
  By analysing the model of Italian clientelism, it appears evident that such 
phenomenon may produce different behaviours, that is, trend oscillations in the 
battle for political consensus. On this concern, the next section will shed light on 
the results that the above model can suggest; on top of that, by following a 
community satisfaction-based perspective, an attempt will be introduced to suggest 
                                                 
1 In order to hide the actual tax increase, policy makers usually do not increase tax rates but, rather, 
tend to exclude tax allowances from the taxable income determination so to achieve the same result. sustainable policies – adaptable also to consensus-achieving needs of parties – that 
politicians might promote in the current Italian context. 
 
  4. Results and implications 
 
  From the analysis of the structure introduced in the previous section, 
several considerations emerge concerning the application of clientelistic practices 
and their outcomes over time. As the model suggests, clientelism may be 
considered a successful electoral strategy in the short term or, at least, until the 
over-employment – it involves – can be independently supported by the financial 
autonomy of a given P.A. and the quality of public services remains within 
tolerable levels. 
 Nevertheless, historical data highlight the politicians incapability in 
combining consensus achievement-oriented clientelistic applications with the need 
for the wealth increase of a region. 
  Therefore, in order to reduce negative effects stemming from clientelism, 
the model dynamics suggest two different approaches: 
1.   direct approach, which tends to prevent clientelism applications by 
diminishing the effect of those factors affecting its accomplishment from the top 
(see fig. 4); 
2.   indirect approach, which instead aims to dissolve the effects already 
caused by clientelism (e.g. over-employment, under-qualified personnel, 
inefficiencies, etc.) by creating effective resistances for the application of the 
mechanism. 
  In both cases, it seems fundamental that political accountability and 
determination should drive institutions to adopt radical changes in the cultural 
background of Italian public sector. 
  Concerning the former approach, several solutions may be found to relieve 
the impact of those socio-economic factors that affect the raise of clientelism. 
  Specifically, investing public resources in higher education and sustaining 
both private enterprises in crisis and the establishment of new ones certainly can 
reduce the unemployment rate and mitigate those harmful effects of economic 
crises. These solutions are strongly recommended in less-developed regions as 
southern Italy, where the context historically suffers from the lack of a lively 
entrepreneurial spirit. Similarly, the extraordinary number of privileges – that 
elected politicians hold – should be considerably cut, mainly given that there is no-
logical correlation to the public offices they should facilitate. In addition, such 
special prerogatives subtend an enormous amount of money that inexorably 
weights on public budgets and, so, on tax expenses of citizens who doubtlessly 
would prefer to see their money spent for the widespread enjoyment of common 
goods. Political privileges removal also helps Italian society to re-focus on the 
actual role policy makers must responsibly perform as servants of the community. 
Then, such re-qualification of political offices would gradually brings political 
competitions to increase the value of candidates electoral programs and, in turn, 
refuse unfair agreements with voters. 
 On the other hand, the indirect approach tries to ruin the negative 
consequences of clientelism by preventing harmful actions of public managers. 
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performance-oriented strategies so to ensure an efficient creation of value and 
bring benefits towards the community. Particularly, social accountability and 
performance management represent the key drivers to achieve such goal. 
  Accountability not only pushes public managers and civil servants to be 
responsible to the extent that they are required to answer for their actions, but also 
includes the means by which P.P.A.A. and their employees manage the diverse 
expectations generated within and outside the organization. This involves that, by 
combating administrative corruption, social accountability – together with integrity 
and transparency of public actions – may enable P.P.A.A. to successfully tackle the 
deficiencies of the institutional framework. Therefore, accountability encourages 
administrators and civil servants to improve their performance which represents the 
output of the overall public action and, consequently, a critical lever for the long-
term consensus preservation. 
  Even so, assigning responsible roles to workers subtends clarity of their 
tasks objectives and performance measurement systems capable to identify 
weaknesses issues and improvable areas. Then, even if a sophisticated and well-
designed system of performance management is not as common in the public sector 
as in the corporate sector, performance management is considered absolutely 
essential to reach satisfying results. 
 A successful performance management system includes performance 
planning, task assignment, monitoring, measurement, evaluation, feedback, 
strategic control and the application of associated incentives to workers. The sum 
of these elements constitutes the accountability system to which workers are 
subjected in the execution of their jobs. In addition, a so-designed performance 
management system also includes procedures that define and regulate areas of 
freedom, monitoring and control, responsible parties and their roles, related 
authority, and rewards and penalties. As a result, the adoption of effective planning 
and control systems may critically highlight performance gaps – as over-
employment and under-qualified personnel – and, hence, opportunely provide 
remedies to successfully overcome such dysfunctions in a learning-oriented 
perspective. In the same perspective, performance results should be reported and 
communicated to social stakeholders which are then involved in participating in 
public affairs. Of course, performance management does not represent a perfect 
solution but, at worst, it can be useful to transform Italian clientelism from the 
current extreme to a moderate form which would limit its negative consequences 
on the community wealth. 
  Particularly, the importance of strategic control systems stems from the 
specification of strategic resources and performance key drivers related to their 
correspondent responsible offices. On this concern, figure 3 synthetically displays 
how planning and control systems work according to a sustainable perspective. 
 











Figure 3 The synthetic perspective of planning and control systems 
adaptation from Bianchi (2009) 
 
  By measuring critical areas performances through proper indicators and 
assigning respectively responsibility roles in correspondence of critical areas, 
managers are facilitated in managing public organizations through the 
simplification of decision making processes and, by levering on strategic resources, 
are able to orient their organizations to the improvement of effectiveness, efficacy 
and impact on the society. Actually, the implementation of strategic control 
systems in P.P.A.A. has been already recognized as an essential condition to 
improve public services and, even better, several laws and authorities outlines 
explicitly recommend to introduce performance-oriented mechanisms in public 
organizations. 
  However, even if best practices of private enterprises could be similarly 
replicated in the public sector, introducing performance management tools in 
P.P.A.A. encounters resistances and complexities and, due to this, the existing 
attempts currently result useless. 
  Above all, the main obstacles concern the following circumstances: 
1.   The Italian P.A. system suffers from bureaucratic internal idiosyncrasy, 
that is, public organizations are seen as sums of offices and tasks rather than 
systems coordinated to achieve shared goals. 
2.   Strategic control systems cannot be useful without a specific adaptation 
to the characteristics of the selected organization. Further, those organizations – 
that carry out the same activities – should use the same set of control indexes both 
at national and regional level in order to create a universal information platform to 
compare data and performance results (i.e. benchmarking comparison). 
3.    The linkage between governors and public managers appears 
unbalanced in terms of respective competencies and tasks since the influence of the 
formers is often so invasive that managers are unable to express their managerial 
skills. Indeed, governors should charge managers on the basis of their managerial 
skills and, once in charge, evaluate them by looking at the performance they reach 
in managing public organizations. In other words, in accordance to the political 
guidelines of the government, the autonomy of public managers should be 
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consequently, supported by high rates of the community satisfaction index. 
4.    Most public employees are averse to undergo any serious forms of 
performance control on their operational activities since this may upset their lazy 
working approach and promote a meritocracy-based culture which forces them to 
increase productivity at work. 
  The above resistances mainly stem from a well-established cultural setting 
that tends to consider public organizations as old bureaucratic machines in which 
the respect of procedures is placed before the efficiency and the quality of public 
services, and the core performance parameter corresponds to the satisfaction of 
politicians rather than that of citizens and other stakeholders.  
  Nevertheless, by changing such cultural approach, the implementation of 
performance management may represent an effective solution to moderate negative 
effects of clientelism on the community wealth. 
 
  Conclusions and research perspectives 
 
  This paper has tried to understand why Italian clientelism form represents 
an unsustainable political strategy to adopt in the battle for consensus by 
highlighting cause-and-effect relationships among relevant variables of its 
democratic system. 
  The development of this research has been conducted through a System 
Dynamics approach that has allowed the author to build a model structure in which 
those variables influence one another on the basis of linear and non-linear relations 
among them. In particular, the lastingness of an extreme form of clientelism 
produces the decrease of consensus in the long term due to its negative effects on 
the wealth of citizens. Indeed, a multiplicity of dysfunctions (e.g. over-
employment, lack of services quality, public value dispersion, inefficiencies, high 
tax rates, etc.) directly impact on the satisfaction of the community and this 
determines the instability of current governments. On the light of the model 
relationships, suggested solutions have been discussed in order to overcome 
negative effects of clientelistic practices according to a community satisfaction-
oriented perspective. Nevertheless, the awareness that this research is of course 
improvable leads to extend the dynamic analysis to empirical evidence and case 
studies which may better clarify the implications of the phenomenon over time and, 
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